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APPELLANT'S HEPL Y BRIEF
TO RESPONDENTS' CROSS APPEAL

STATE~IENT OF FACTS vVITH RELATION
TO RULING OF THE LU\YER COURT ON
APPELLANTS' _MOTION FOR NE"r TRIAL.

Respondents' cross appeal in this action upon the
question of the lower court, reducing the attorney's fee
from $750.00 to $500.00 and contends the court erred
in reducing the attorne~r's fee awar1led by the jury.
1

Upon the entry of the judgment on the verdict
in this matter by the court, the Appellants filed a motion
with the court to have verdict and judgment set aside
and to have judgment entered in accordance with defendants' motion for directed verdict and motion for
new trial ( R. 71 ) .
U pan the hearing of this motion the court informed
the Attorney for Respondent that unless he consented
to a reduction of the Attorney's fee from $750.00, as
found by the jury, which the Appellants contend was
improperly submitted to the jury, the court would
grant Appellants' motion for a new trial, and in accordance therewith the attorney for Respondents consented
to the reduction, rather than have a new trial granted.
From the order of the court, (R-87) Respondents'
cross appeal, and in response to Respondents' Cross
Appeal, Appellants submit the following:

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REDUCING THE ATTORNEY'S FEE A 'VARDED BY
THE JURY. THE COURT DID, ERR, HO,VEVER, IN SUBMITTING TO THE JURY INSTRUCTION 9-D AND PROPOSITION NO. 3
IN ITS SPECIAL VERDICT.
As quoted in Respondents' brief, we quote again
in support of Appellants' contention:
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Tille :J8-l-18 UCA 1953:
''ln action brought to enforce any lien under
this chapter the successful parties shall be entitled lo recover a reasonable attorney's fee, to
be fi,rcd by the court, which shall be taxed as
cosb. in this action." (Emphasis supplied).
In the first place it is the contention of Appellants
that the court should ne,·er have submitted the question
0f attorneys fees to the jury in view of the language
of the foregoing quoted Section 38-1-18 UCA 1953.
If the court allowed any attorney's fee at all, it should
have been fixed by the court and not the jury. After
the verdict of the jury, we are inclined to believe the
court realized this and pursuant thereto did fix the
attorney's fee, in granting the Appellants' motion for
a new trial unless Respondents' attorney did reduce
the fee fixed by the jury in the sum of $750.00 to that
of $500.00 (R-87).
We agree with Respondents' attorney as contended
for in his Lrief in paragraph two at page 25, that
"what was a reasonable fee in 19.30 may not be reasonable in 1966 due to the reduced buying power of the
dollar."
Under Seetion 5:2-1-18 UCA 19~3 the statute provided that the successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee to be fixed by the
court, not to exceed $25. U po11 the amendment of this
statute wherein the legislature provided for a reasonable
attorney's fee without fixing the amount we are inclined
to Lelieve that the~· did not intend to have the court
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fix an attorney's fee out of proportion to the value of
the dollar due to inflationary prices in 1966. Inflation
has not reduced the value of the dollar to the extent
which Respondents' attorney 'vould contend for in
proportion to the sum of $25.00, as provided by
Section 52-1-18, UCA 1943, to that of $500.00 now
fixed by the court. If the contention of Respondents'
attorney is correct that the Appellate Court has a right
to fix attorney's fees in such cases, which Appellants
contend is not correct, it is the contention of the Aplants that this fee of $500.00 should be reduced accordingly.

POINT II
IT IS THE PREROGATIVE OF THE
TRlAL COURT TO FIX A REASONABLE
ATTORNEY'S FEE, IF ONE IS ALLOWED
AND NOT THE SUPREME COURT.
The most recent case on this point is Brimwood
Homes, Inc. vs. Knudsen Builders Supply Co., U
Utah 2nd 419, 385 P2d 982, 1963, wherein the Utah
Court stated at page 984:
."The defendant being the successful party is
entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee to be assessed by the lower court."
.More in point are the VV ashington cases of Elmore
v. Graystone of Centralia, Inc., 387 P2nd 75, (Wash.
1963), and Gannon v. Emtman, 40.5 P. 2nd 2.54, ("\\Tash.
1965).
4

In the Elmore case at page 76 the court makes the
following conclusion:
"The judgment is affirmed, but the cause is
remanded to the trial court to consider defendant's motion for an award of Attorney's fees on
appeal."
In the Gannon case at page 257 the court cites the
Elmore decision for the following proposition:
"Respondent will be awarded his costs on appeal, and the cause will be remanded to the trial
court to consider respondent's motion for an
award of attorney's fees on appeal."
It is the contention of Appellants that these cases
support the proposition that it is improper for the
Supreme Court to make an award of Attorney's fees
without remanding the case to the trial court for its
consideration.

POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING
THE JURY THAT AV ALID LIEN EXISTED
AGAINST THE PROPERTY OF DEFENDANTS, D. A. SKEEN AND BERTHA K.
SKEEN, AND ALSO ERRED IN DIRECTING
A VERDICT AGAINST D. A. SKEEN AND
BERTHA K. SKEEN.
Plaintiffs' attorney is not entitled to attorney's
fee for his services in this case, since it is not properly
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an action brought to enforce a lien as contemplated
by the Utah Code pertaining tu mechanic's liens.
As set forth in Appellants' Point 1 aud Point 2
in its main brief, this action is not properly withiu tiie
:Mechanic's lien statute and therefore attorney's fees
cannot be awarded. \Vithout reiterating the argumenb
set forth in said Points 1 and 2, we respectfully refer
thereto in support of this proposition.
Attorney's fees were fixed by the trial court in
accordance with Section 38-1-18 UCA 1953, if such an
attorney's fee were allowable, and the lower court did
not err in exercising its discretion in reducing the
amount improperly set by the jury.
Section 38-1-18 UCA 1953, gives the trial court
exclusive power to set fees, if the case is properly an
action to enforce lien rights.
Plaintiffs' attorney has not cited a single case under
Utah law where an increase in attorney's fee is cited
as being proper. That is because the Utah court has
always considered the question within the discretion of
the trial court in a proper case.
· CONCLUSION
As contended for by Appellants, the court erred
in directing a verdict against the defendants D. A.
Skeen and Bertha K. Skeen, that the property in question, and under the facts, ,.,-as property subject to a
lien, and if said property was not subject to a lien
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in favor of the Respondents, then there was no attorney's fees to be allowed, which, of course, is self evident.
If the court so holds that the property in question
was subject to a lien in favor of Respondents, then it
was the prerogative of the lower court to fix such a
reasonable attorney's fee, and not the Supreme Court
on appeal, as outlined in the cases cited in this reply
brief of the Appellants.

Respectfully submitted,
Benjamin Spence
Attorney for Appellants
1401 Walker Bank Bldg.

Salt Lake City, Utah
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